Size Adjectives and Adnominal Degree Modification by Morzycki, Marcin
Size Adjectives and Adnominal Degree Modification 
1. Introduction 
Marcin Morzycki 
Michigan State University 
In languages that have them, adjectives and the functional structure they project are 
the prototypical means by which gradable notions are expressed, and consequently 
probably the clearest window available onto how degree modification works. But 
degree modification occurs outside the adjectival domain as well (a fact noted by 
Bolinger 1972, Abney 1987, Deutjes 1997, Kennedy and McNally 2004 among oth­
ers) , and the mechanisms that underlie gradabil ity in these non-adjectival contexts 
remain largely mysterious. The big-picture aim of this paper is to shed some light 
onto one comer of this  murky area by examining a variety of non-adjectival degree 
modification in which the gradable predicate is provided by a noun, and an adjec­
tive serves only to characterize the degree to which the gradable predicate holds. In  
the compositional semantics ultimately proposed here, core properties of this con­
struction follow from a restriction on how degrees on one scale can be mapped to 
degrees on another and from a close structural parallel between the nominal and 
adjectival extended projections. 
The phenomenon at issue here is exemplified in  ( 1) :  
( 1) a. George is an enormous idiot. 
b. Gladys is a big beer-drinker. 
c. Three huge goat-cheese enthusiasts were arguing in the comer. 
d. Most really colossal curling fans are difficult to understand. 
The most natural readings for the sentences in ( 1) don 't involve any claim of large 
physical size; rather, the nominal predicate is claimed to hold to a high degree. 
Strikingly, these readings persist and are wel l-behaved in a variety of syntactic and 
semantic contexts, including comparatives, how-questions, and too-constructions: 
(2) a. Gladys is a bigger idiot than Royd. 
b. How big an idiot is Gladys? 
c. Gladys is too big an idiot to talk to. 
The availability of such readings for size adjectives is not a peculiarity of English: 
(3) SPANI S H  
Pedro es  un  gran idiota. 
Pedro is a great idiot 
' Pedro is a big idiot' 
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(4) POLISH 
wielki idiota 
great idiot 
'big idiot' 
Similar effects can be discerned in numerous other languages .  
Section 2 examines this phenomenon in more detail, arguing that it is not 
merely a reflection of some other linguistic (or extralinguistic) process. In doing so, 
two generalizations emerge: these readings are possible only in attributive (in En­
glish, prenominal) positions and, surprisingly, systematically only with adjectives 
that predicate bigness. In section 3, I propose an interpretation for these structures 
that accounts for these generalizations, considering two ways of doing this .  The 
first builds on the intuition that nouns seem less context-sensitive than adjectives 
with respect to the standards that resolve vagueness; the second, on the notion that 
the polarity of a noun and a size adjective serving as its degree modifier must match. 
I settle on the latter. Section 4 develops a means of assembling this interpretation 
compositionally, advocating a structure for the extended NP that closely parallels 
that of the extended AP. Section 5 very briefly concludes. 
2. Two Generalizations and Some More Facts and Complications 
2. 1 .  The Position Generalization 
The degree reading of a size adjective seems to be unavailable in predicative 
positions-(5a) and (6a) are ambiguous, but (5b) and (6b) have only a literal-size 
reading: I 
(5) a. that big beer-drinker 
b. *That beer-drinker is big. 
(6) a. George is an enormous idiot. 
b. *George is an idiot, and he is enormous .  
The degree reading is  also impossible postnominally : 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
a. a bigger beer-drinker than any I've met before 
b. *a beer-drinker bigger than any I've met before 
{more enormous} 'd' th . .  a. a b' I lot an you can Imagme Igger 
. , { *more enormous} . .  b. an IdIOt * ",,- ' than you can Imagme ' olgger 
a. too big a war-monger to tolerate 
b. *a war-monger too big to tolerate 
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This general pattern has analogues outside English. In Spanish and Polish, for 
example, degree readings are also impossible postnominally (as these languages 
can demonstrate perhaps more starkly than English can): 
( 10) S PANISH 
a. Pedro es un gran idiota. 
Pedro is a great idiot 
'Pedro is hugely idiotic.' 
b. Pedro es un idiota grande. 
Pedro is a idiot great 
'Pedro is physically large and an idiot.' 
( 1 1 )  POLISH 
a. wielki kretyn 
great cretin 
'one who is hugely cretinous' 
b. kretyn wielki 
cretin great 
'a cretin who is physically large' 
And, like in English, these readings are impossible in predicative VP positions: 
( 1 2) S PANISH 
Ese idiota es enorme. 
This idiot is enormous 
The size of this idiot is large.' 
( 13) POLISH 
Ten kretyn jest wielki 
This  cretin is great 
'This cretin is large in size.' 
This  generalization can be slated more officially as in ( 14) :  
( 14) THE POSITION GENERALIZATION: Degree readings of size adjectives are 
possible only prenominally. 
2.2.  The Bigness Generalization 
The other basic generalization in this domain is that adjectives that predicate bigness 
(that is, upward monotonic size adjectives) are systematically able to receive degree 
readings, but this is not the case for adjectives that predicate smallness: 
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big 
enormous 
George is a 
huge 
idiot. colossal ( 1 5) 
mammoth 
gargantuan 
* small 
*tiny 
( 1 6) George is a 
*minuscule 
idiot. *microscopic 
*dirninutive 
*minute 
Adjectives of smallness may not be as systematic in resisting degree readings as ad­
jectives of bigness are in accepting them. Slight, for example, has a degree reading 
as its most natural interpretation : 
(1 7) George is a slight idiot. 
This example is in several respects not clear-cut, though. For one thing, it is not 
at all clear that slight is a size adjective in the first place. It predicates, after all, 
something like slenderness, which is certainly related to size, but, equally certainly, 
not identical to it. Moreover, it's not clear that even this not-quite-size reading is 
retained in contemporary English as anything other than a literary affectation. And, 
to my knowledge, slight is the only possible adjective of smallness in English that 
has a degree reading, which suggests that this case really involves a distinct lexical 
meaning. 
This contrasts sharply with adjectives that predicate bigness, which have a 
compatibility with degree readings that is not only systematic but actually seems to 
be productive. So far as I know, Godzilla-scale is not an existing English adjective 
of bigness, and Chihuahua-scale is not an existing adjective of smallness. With 
( 1 8) and ( 1 9), I hereby attempt to coin them: 
( 1 8) a. Holy crap, there 's a Godzilla-scale chunk of rotting meat on your 
kitchen floor ! 
b. The bastard had a Godzilla-scale trust fund all his life. 
( 1 9) a. I can almost make out somewhere in the distance the faintest glimmer of 
a Chihuahua-scale comet. 
b. The model had this weird perky Chihuahua-scale nose. 
While this sort of judgment is for obvious reasons not entirely straightforward, it 
seems natural to assign a degree interpretation to (20a), and distinctly more natural 
than assigning such a reading to (20b): 
(20) a. He's a Godzilla-scale idiot. 
b. He's a Chihuahua-scale idiot. 
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If in fact a degree reading comes for free whenever a novel adjective of bigness 
is coined, it suggests strongly that the availability of degree readings is not an ac­
cidental lexical property of these adjectives, but rather an essential part of the job 
description for adjectives of bigness. 
Like the Position Generalization, this pattern is not unique to English: 
(2 1 )  S PANISH 
Pedro es un pequeno idiota. 
Pedro is a small idiot 
'Pedro is both small and an idiot.' 
(22) POLISH 
maly kretyn 
small cretin 
'cretin small in size' 
So, to state this generalization more officially: 
(23) THE B IGNESS GENERALIZATION : Adjectives that predicate bigness 
systematically license degree readings. Adjectives that predicate smallness 
don't generally license such readings. 
2.3 . Not Just Vagueness, Not Just Metaphor 
A natural impulse at first glance is to regard degree readings of size adjectives as 
simply an instance of some broader cognitive process. Perhaps these readings arise 
as a kind of metaphor, one might suggest, or perhaps they are the product of a 
peculiar kind of vagueness. But the facts don't accord with such an understanding. 
The contrast between the degree and size readings passes tests for distin­
guishing ambiguity from vagueness. If this were vagueness, it should be perfectly 
unremarkable to predicate big in (24) of a single conjoined NP with different read­
ings for each conjunct. So too with enormous in (25) .  But in fact, doing so has the 
flavor of wordplay-the telltale sense of oddness characteristic of zeugma: 
(24) a. The other driver was a really big bastard and basketball player. 
b. The other driver was a really big basketball player and bastard. 
(25) a. Larry is an enormous fan of curling and former mafia goon. 
b. Larry is  an enormous former mafia goon and fan of curling. 
These examples are imperfect, however, in that it is possible in principle to alleviate 
the sense of oddness by construing the size adjective with the left conjunct alone. 
Perhaps a clearer result can be attained by explicitly blocking one of the 
readings: 
(26) a. Gladys isn't very big, but she is a very big beer-drinker. 
b. Harry isn't enormous, but he is an enormous idiot. 
SIZE ADJECTIVES AND AoNOMINAL DEGREE MODIFICATION 
(27) a. ilThis chair isn 't very big, but it is a very big chair. 
b. ilThat building isn't enormous, but it is an enormous building. 
There is no sense of contradiction in (26), unlike in (27), because two distinct read­
ings are involved, and one can be negated without negating the other. 
Another, perhaps more promising approach along similar lines would be to 
construe degree readings of size adjectives as the outcome of an extra-linguistic 
cognitive process of metaphorical extension. But this raises numerous difficult 
questions that have much more straightforward answers if this is understood as a 
grammatical rather than extra-linguistic phenomenon. First, why should the avail­
ability of such metaphoric extension be sensitive to syntactic position? Second, 
why should this be possible only for adjectives of bigness? And third, why should 
these metaphors be apparently so conventionalized? That is, why should they come 
seemingly for free, with no conscious awareness by either speaker or hearer that 
something metaphoric has been said? These questions have natural answers if this 
is understood in grammatical rather than extralinguistic terms. 
2.4. Some Additional Distinctions 
There are at least two other uses of size adjectives that must be distinguished from 
true degree uses. 
ABSTRACT S IZE READINGS Some ordinary size readings of size adjectives have 
a roughly degree-like flavor because of the nature of the modified NP: 
(28) a. an enormous mistake 
b. a huge snowstorm 
c. a big catastrophe 
d. a huge problem 
But these are not true degree readings. Rather, they are size readings that make 
reference to size along a possibly abstract dimension-one that may correlate with 
some intuitive sense of extremeness or severity. That is, these uses, unlike true 
degree readings, do seem to be in some important sense genuinely metaphorical. 
They pattern with ordinary size readings rather than with degree readings in several 
respects. 
One of these is a systematic failure to accord with the Position 
Generalization-these readings can occur in predicative positions: 
(29) a. That was a mistake, and it was enormous .  
b .  That was a snowstorm, and i t  was huge. 
c. a catastrophe bigger than any other 
d. a problem too huge to fully comprehend 
Another is that they systematically fail to accord with the Bigness Generalization­
adjectives that predicate smallness behave just like ones that predicate bigness: 
1 2 1  
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big 
enormous 
(30) That was a 
huge 
mistake. colossal 
mammoth 
gargantuan 
small 
tiny 
(3 1 )  That was a 
minuscule mistake. microscopic 
diminutive 
minute 
And finally, in these abstract-size cases, there is no ambiguity, no clear distinction 
between two readings, so sentences l ike (32) are contradictory: 
(32) a. #'fhat mistake wasn 't enormous, but it was a enormous mistake. 
b. #'fhat snowstorm wasn 't huge, but it was a huge snowstorm. 
c. #'fhat catastrophe wasn't big, but it was a big catastrophe. 
d. #'fhat problem wasn't huge, but it was a huge problem. 
SIGNIFICANCE READINGS There is another, more puzzling use of size adjec­
tives that has a non-size flavor. On this use, these adjectives seem to predicate 
(in)significance: 
(33) a. the big political figures of the 20th century 
b. a huge corporate mucky-muck 
c. a small little man 
d. some puny judge somewhere 
I have no theory to offer of these readings, or even of what relation they might 
bear to abstract size readings. They are rather odd beasts. Unlike degree read­
ings, significance readings don't involve degrees on a scale provided by the head 
noun (degrees of idiocy, of stamp-collector-hood, etc.) .  Rather, they always in­
volve degrees of importance, irrespective of the noun. And unlike degree readings, 
significance readings don ' t  accord with the Bigness Generalization. Adjectives of 
smallness give rise to these readings very naturally, as (33) reflects. Like degree 
readings, though, significance readings are sensitive to syntactic position. The na­
ture of this sensitivity is unclear, though. They usually resist predicative uses, but 
in some cases allow them: 
(34) a. *?These political figures were big. 
b. *?This corporate mucky-muck is huge. 
c. ?This man is little . 
(35) You'll be huge in Bolivia! The biggest ! 
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3. The Interpretation, and Explaining the Bigness Generalization 
3 . 1 .  An Initial Step: What Is Nominal Gradability? 
To begin developing an interpretation, it will be necessary to make some initial basic 
assumptions about how degrees and gradability work in the nominal domain. There 
are a number of possibilities. One natural course would be to adopt a supervaluation 
understanding of vagueness, in which there is no need for degrees as such in the 
first place (Kamp 1975, Fine 1 975, others). Another would be to suppose that 
nouns-or at least certain nouns-have degree arguments and are associated with 
scales (a background assumption in e.g. Matushansky 200 1 ). I adopt the second 
view here. Kennedy 1997 provides some arguments in favor of such degree-based 
explanations. But it is worth noting that the supervaluation approach might actually 
be particularly appropriate for nominals, because in the nominal domain linguistic 
manipulation of vagueness has a distinctly 'derived' or 'secondary' character that 
would seem to accord with this conception. 
An important drawback of supposing that nouns may have degree arguments 
is that it levels the type-theoretic distinction between nouns and adjectives, thereby 
risking losing the generalization that it is adjectives, not nouns, that are the locus of 
gradability. But this could be avoided by simply assuming that degrees aren't  argu­
ments of nouns for compositional purposes, but are a kind of implicit argument that 
results in a pronoun-like dependence on a degree (much like e.g. the dependance of 
local on a contextually supplied place) :2 
(36) [ idiotd D = AX . X is d-idiotic 
This maintains the type-theoretic distinction between nouns and adjectives, but still 
provides access to the degree variable from higher up via binding. 
3.2. An Appealing But Flawed Approach: The Moderation Requirement 
Having made these assumptions, the task at hand is to provide a semantics  that 
derives the Bigness Generalization-that is, a semantics for big idiot that explains 
what goes wrong in small idiot. I ' ll consider two options. The first of these seems 
to be fatally flawed, but I will sketch it here even so because it strikes me as having 
an intuitive appeal that perhaps the more empirically adequate alternative lacks. 
The intuition behind this approach is that adjectives of smallness run afoul 
of a restriction on how contextually-supplied standards work in the nominal do­
main: standards associated with nouns cannot vary as freely as standards associated 
with adjectives. No matter how tall a basketball player is, if he is the shortest in the 
relevant comparison class, he will not count as tall. But it is certainly not the case 
that Isaac Newton would, given an appropriate comparison class, count as an idiot. 
This can be understood as a requirement that standards in the nominal domain must 
be neither set very high nor very low: 
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(37) THE MODERATION REQUIREMENT 
For any noun N, the standard S IN I  the context fixes on the scale associated 
with N can't  be a big degree and it can't be a small one: 
--,big(S(N I )  1\ --,small(s( N ) )  
O f  course, what counts as a big degree and what counts as a small one i s  itself 
context-sensitive. It is an important property of this approach that it involves predi­
cating bigness and smallness directly of degrees. In most cases, predicating adjec­
tival denotations of degrees would be bizarre-if degrees are simply intervals on a 
scale along some dimension, they aren't objects that can be surprising, for example, 
or lovely. But intervals do have size, so predicating bigness and smallness of them 
seems coherent. 
To see how (37) helps, let's assume that the denotation of Floyd is a big 
idiot is as in (38), where Sidiot is the contextually-supplied standard for idiocy: 
(38) [ Floyd is a big idiot ] 
= 3d :--,big(sidiot) 1\ --,small(sidiot) [Floyd is d-idiotic 1\ d 2: 
Sidiot 1\ big( d)] 
This requires that for Floyd to be a big idiot, there must be a degree of his idiocy 
that both is big and exceeds (or meets) the standard. If big idiot leads to denotations 
like (38), it seems reasonable to suppose that small idiot would lead to denotations 
like (39) : 
(39) [ Floyd is a small idiot ] 
= 3d:--,big(s [ idiot ] ) 1\ --,small(s [ idiot ] ) [Floyd is d-idiotic 1\ d 2: 
Sidiot 1\ small(d)] 
This, though, necessarily results in failure of presupposition. Because of the mono­
tonicity of small, if d-the degree of Floyd's height-is small and yet larger than 
the standard Sidiot, then Sidiot must also be small. But this is precisely what the mod­
eration requirement rules out. Of course, no such difficulty results for big idiot 
because d can be both big and yet larger than the standard without requiring that 
the standard therefore also be big. 
There is a significant problem with this approach, though. Because it re­
lies on a constraint on standard-setting, it predicts that the Bigness Generaliza­
tion should arise only where standards play a role in the semantics? One place 
where standards standardly don't come into play is in comparatives and superla­
tives. At least in English, though, the effect does not go away in these contexts­
interestingly, though, the contrasts do seem a bit less clear: 
(40) a. Floyd is a {%?bigglelr } idiot than Clyde is . - sma er 
b. Floyd is the { nt ? bigglel st } idiot I know. "lO · sma est 
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However intriguingly diminished the contrast seems to be, this is a profound prob­
lem for this kind of explanation. To be sure, one might imagine ways to navigate 
around it-none at all attractive-but unmistakably, this strikes at the very core of 
the idea. 
3 .3 .  Another Approach: Relating Distinct Scales and Degree Polarity 
An alternative approach to explaining the Bigness Generalization takes as its start­
ing point a different intuition about what goes wrong in small idiot: that the prob­
lem is one of adjectival polarity, in some ways comparable to what goes wrong in 
cross-polar anomaly (Kennedy 1997, 2(01) :  
(41 )  a .  #'fhis book i s  longer than that one is short. 
b. #floyd is taller than Clyde is short. 
Kennedy advances a view of these facts in which adjective pairs of different polarity, 
such as big and small, involve degrees that are on the same scale (i .e., along the 
same dimension) but in principle incommensurable because of a fundamental sortal 
distinction between positive and negative degrees. 
Building on Seuren 1 978, 1984 and von Stechow 1 984, he represents de­
grees as intervals ( ,extents '),  with positive degrees extending from the lowermost 
portion of the scale to a positive point on the scale, and negative degrees extending 
from such a point upward to the uppermost portion of the scale. Thus if Floyd is 6 
feet tall, the positive and negative degrees of his height will be as in (42): 
(42) HEIGHT S CALE 
0 ------- 6 feet -------- 00 
positive extent negative extent 
Antonymous adjectives involve the same scale, but different sorts of degrees-tall 
measures height in terms of positive degrees, and short in terms of negative ones. 
Given the right assumptions about how comparatives work, this explains cross-polar 
anomaly: For Floyd is taller than Clyde is short to be true, the degree to which 
Floyd is tall must properly include the degree to which Clyde is short. A degree of 
tallness is a positive degree; a degree of shortness a negative one. But because they 
are by definition complementary, a positive degree can't include a negative one. 
The sentence is therefore anomalous, because there can't in principle be a degree 
that satisfies it. 
This may help with the problem at issue here. Perhaps idiot-and nouns 
generally-always involve positive degrees.4 On the assumptions above, it would 
already be the case that big involves positive degrees and small involves negative 
ones. Might the problem that underlies the Bigness Generalization, then, be that 
the negative degrees of small can't  be compared in the right way with the positive 
degrees of idiot? 
Expressing this idea in this Kennedy-style framework just as it is turns out 
to be awkward (though probably not impossible) because, fundamentally, these as-
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sumptions provide an account of incommensurability, but it's not at all clear that 
degrees of idiocy and degrees of bigness are in any real sense being compared to 
each other in the sense involved in cross-polar anomaly. A more congenial envi­
ronment in which this line of thinking can be expressed may be available, though, 
in the general conception offered by a framework that makes an even more funda­
mental sortal distinction between positive and negative degrees. In Vector Space 
Semantics (Zwarts 1997, Zwarts and Winter 2000, Faller 2000, Winter 2001 ,  Win­
ter 2004): degrees are construed not as intervals but as vectors. They inherently 
encode direction on a scale, and are therefore inherently positive or negative (and 
not merely by virtue of which portion of a scale they occupy). 
For current purposes, it will suffice to assume a bastardized toy version of 
the highly articulated conception of degrees as vectors developed by Faller 2000 
and Winter 2004. I'll provide here only a thumbnail sketch of a few of the crucial 
features of this understanding of the ontology of degrees. First, scales themselves 
are defined as positive or negative. A scale is a pair of a basic 'unit vector' and a set 
of real numbers. Negative scales are just those with a negative unit vector. Second, 
there is a dimension function that maps an individual to a corresponding vector On 
some scale: dims (x) is the vector corresponding to x on the scale S.  Third, there 
is an anti-dimension function that maps a set of vectors onto a set of corresponding 
individuals: dims(v) is the set of individuals such that the dimension function maps 
them to v on S .5 
Very roughly, the denotation of a simple unmodified adjective such as tall is 
along the lines of (43) (where the polarity of the scale is explicitly indicated with + 
or -) :  
(43) [ Mary is tall D = dim+height (Mary) > S+height 
That is, Mary is tall asserts that Mary's vector on the scale of positive height-that 
is, the scale of tallness--exceeds the contextually-supplied standard vector for that 
scale. 
Maybe, then, big idiot can be interpreted as involving a kind of double 
mapping-first an individual is mapped onto a corresponding vector On the scale 
of idiocy, then that vector itself is mapped onto a corresponding vector On the scale 
of bigness. This is, of course, simply the reflection in this framework of the idea 
that degree readings of size adjectives involve predicating size adjectives directly of 
degrees. Thus big idiot will be interpreted as in (44a), and, analogously, small idiot 
as in (44b) : 
(44) a. [ big idiot D = AX . dim+idiOCY(X) > S+idiocy 1\ 
dim+size ( dim+idiocy(X» > S+size 
b. [ small idiot D = Ax . dim+idiocy(X) > S+idiocy 1\ 
dim_Size (dim+idiocy(X» > Lsize 
Perhaps what goes awry in small idiot, then, is the .mapping from an idiocy degree 
to a size degree. In (44b), the dimension function is serving as a kind of polarity­
reverser, mapping a positive degree onto a negative one. There is probably no reason 
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why this should be impossible a priori. But likewise, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that the grammar might rule out this kind of operation, either in general or (more 
plausibly) in particular constructions. 
The idea, then, is that it may be simply a fact about how degrees on one scale 
are mapped onto another--or at least about how the size of degrees is evaluated, at 
least in this construction-that polarity is always preserved. Phrasing it metaphor­
ically, the size of degrees is always evaluated by measuring in the direction of the 
vector, along the grain, so to speak. More precisely: 
(45) POLARITY PRESERVATION PRINCIPLE 
For any scale S and degree d of the same polarity, dim+s( -d) and 
dim_s (+d) are both undefined. 
It would of course be a more interesting result to find evidence of this at work more 
generally in the grammar. Certainly, framed as it is here, it has the character of 
something one might expect to be more general . But by the same token, if the 
Moderation Requirement could be understood as simply a presupposition arising 
from how the nominal extended projection is organized, it seems reasonable that 
this might be understood in these terms as well. 
4. Assembling the Interpretation Syntactically 
4. 1 .  Degree Head In NP? 
To assemble the denotations above, something must introduce the semantic glue 
that relates the adjective and the noun in the appropriate way. There is reason 
to think that the syntax provides just such a thing-namely, a degree head in the 
nominal extended projection: 
(46) DP 
� 
I 
DegNoMP 
jbig �I DegNoM' 
huge � 
enormous DegNoM : 
mammoth I 
. NP 
As (46) reflects, a particular DegNOM head may introduce size adjectives with de­
gree readings in its specifier. 
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4.2. Relieving Functional Head Nausea 
If degree readings of size adjectives were the only motivation for a nominal degree 
head, this might be unappealing. But in fact, there is a battery of independent 
arguments for such a thing: 
ARGUMENT 1 :  One is a purely theoretical argument: there is  something virtually 
inevitable about a nominal degree argument if we adopt the Abney 1 987 proposal 
that As can be heads in the nominal projection along with the common view that the 
extended AP is headed by a Deg projection (Corver 1 990, Kennedy 1 997, others). 
ARGUMENT 2 :  A related argument: the semantics Kennedy assigns to adjectives 
essentially requires a Deg head to occur immediately above every AP. For Kennedy, 
an AP denotes a measure function that yields degrees .  A DegP, on the other hand, 
is a predicate of individuals. Kennedy proposes that the role of Deg is to map from 
the former type to the latter. So, if As can occur in the extended nominal projection 
as Abney suggests, Degs must on this view occur above them in order to provide a 
predicate of individuals for a D to ultimately combine with. 
ARGUMENT 3 :  There are many expressions that plausibly spell out such a Deg 
head. Most of these appear superficially to be adjectives: 
(47) 
{real } 
true .d. a I 1 lOt tota 
complete 
But these are not adjectival uses of these expressions. The adjectival homophones 
of all these expressions can occur predicatively, but these nominal degree words can 
only occur attributively : 
(48) *That idiot is 
true 
I . 
{real } 
tota 
complete 
On the degree reading, these are all impossible-they have only the ordinary non­
degree reading in this position. 
ARGUMENT 4: Treating such uses of real and others as nominal Deg heads 
accounts for their inability to occur with their own degree words, as their adjectival 
counterparts can: 
(49) * 
{problem} 
a. a very real .d. 1 lOt 
. {Observations} b. *several qUIte true .
d. 1 lOts 
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. {deSCriPtion} 
c. *a fairly complete 'd' I lOt 
Again, in all these cases, only the normal adjectival non-degree reading is possi­
ble . (Similar superficially adjective-like adnominal degree words can be detected 
in other languages as well .) 
ARGUMENT 5 :  The expressions that are plausible nominal degree words are of 
exactly the sort that historically develop into Deg heads in the adjectival domain­
that is, they are cognate with the same kind of adjective. Adjectival Deg heads arise 
from expressions meaning roughly 'real ' or 'true' as in (50), and the examples in 
(5 1 )  are even more transparent:6 : 
(50) a. verily --> very 
b. real --> real (in e.g. real tall) 
(5 1 ) a. complete --> completely 
b. total --> totally 
ARGUMENT 6 :  Placing size adjectives in the specifier of a nominal functional 
projection accords with a well-established line of research that associates adjectives 
with specifier positions of nominal functional heads (Cinque 1994, Laenzlinger 
2000 and many others). 
ARGUMENT 7 :  This sort of structure provides a natural parse for more of a 
structures like (52): 
(52) He met [DP [DegP more [pp of an idiot]]] the day after. 
ARGUMENT 8 :  Measure phrases inside DP such as those in (53) might also 
benefit from this sort of analysis: 
(53) a. a five-mile hike 
b. a two-pound bag 
If these measure phrases were placed in the specifier position of nominal DegP, this 
would parallel the structure of measure phrases in AP (Abney 1 987, Corver 1 990, 
Kennedy 1 997, Grimshaw 199 1 ), and perhaps in PP and VP (Morzycki 2004) as 
well . 
ARGUMENT 9 :  A not quite independent argument: I have not relied on restric­
tions on what adjectives can co-occur with size adjectives that receive degree read­
ings, but they seem to support a similar conclusion. It is not in general possible for 
other adjectives to occur above these size adjectives: 
(54) a. *?a dangerous big idiot 
b. *?some happy enormous fans of curling 
c. *?the popular gargantuan stars of the ' 40s 
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If nominal DegP occupies a fixed position high in DP, above where most adjectives 
adjoin, this alone would rule out such sentences. 
THE POS ITION GENERALIZATION : Perhaps the most important argument, 
though, is the Position Generalization itself. If size adjectives receive degree read­
ings only in the specifier of a nominal degree projection as proposed here, it follows 
that they can only be used attributively. 
4.3 . How Things Fit Together 
This kind of structure provides a natural way to build up the denotations proposed 
earlier, on either of the approaches to the semantics considered above. Since it 
better accords with the data, I will adopt the vector-space(-ftavored) approach to 
illustrate this here. 
For the size adjective itseIf-or rather its extended projection-it suffices to 
assume that it denotes a simple property of individuals (where S+size is the standard 
for positive size, that is, for bigness): 7 
(55) [ bigs.,�, D = AX . dim+size (x) > S+Size 
With appropriate modifications, the previously suggested denotation for idiot could 
remain essentially intact: 
(56) [ idiotd.s.idiOCY ] = AX . dim+idiOCY(x) = d /\ d > S+idiocy 
In the spirit of Kennedy 1 997, I assume here that the nominal degree head does the 
compositional heavy-lifting of relating the size adjective and the noun by 'finding' 
the degree variable (by binding it) and offering it up for modification:8 
(57) [ DEG-SIZE D = AN (d,  (e ,  t» >.A(e, t) Ax . A( td [N( d) (x) ] )  
If i t  turns out to be necessary, as seems likely though less interesting, to associate 
the Polarity Preservation Principle of section 3 with this construction specifically, 
the denotation of DEG-SIZE would of course be the natural place to locate this 
restriction. 
The denotation in (57) applies to functions from degrees to noun denota­
tions .  If a noun has an implicit degree variable as in (56), DEG-SIZE can bind this 
degree variable. The outcome: 
(58) a. [ DEG-S1ZEd idiotd.s+'diocy ] 
= [ DEG-SIZE ] ( [  d idiotd.s.,_y ] ) 
= >.A(e, t) AX . A(Ld [dim+idiocy(X) = d /\ d > S+idiocy] ) 
b. [ big DEG-SIZEd idiotd.s.,diOCY ] 
= [ DEG-SIZEd idiotd.s+""ocy ] ( [  big ] ) 
= dim+size ( td [dim+idiocy(X) = d /\ d > S+idiOcy] ) > S+Size 
This seems to yield the right truth conditions. 
SIZE ADJECfIVES AND ADNOMINAL DEGREE MODIFICATION 
5. A Final Word 
To summarize, a core empirical argument here has been that degree readings of 
size adjectives are a distinct linguistic phenomenon, and not merely a consequence 
of vagueness or metaphor. Further, these readings are systematically possible only 
with adjectives of bigness, a fact ultimately explained here by supposing that the po­
larity of a noun and a size adjective serving as its degree modifier must match. The 
alternative possibility was also considered that this might be explained instead by 
supposing that nominal vagueness tolerates only moderate values for contextually­
supplied standards. The proposed interpretation relies on a nominal Degree head, 
and a range of independent evidence for the existence of such a projection was 
provided. 
There are, of course, many unanswered questions in this general domain, 
but there are a few of particularly direct relevance that have not been addressed 
here. Among them is the question of what the semantics is of the other nominal de­
gree heads proposed here, and of what might be revealed about the cross-categorial 
nature of degree modification by a comparative examination of these degree heads 
and the familiar ones in the extended AP. Also unaddressed here is the question 
of how nominal scale structure can vary. For example, does the contrast between 
complete idiot and *complete smoker indicate that idiocy has an upper bound and 
smoker-hood does not? And this area too provides a place where the nominal and 
adjectival degree systems might fruitfully be compared, perhaps shedding some 
light on gradability more generally. There is also a much more local but nonethe­
less vexing question on which I can currently say nothing: Why does large idiot 
seem so odd? A degree reading is not very natural here, but, given what has been 
said here, it is not altogether obvious precisely what it is about large that renders 
it something other than a size adjective in the appropriate sense. This would be 
more alarming if it weren't the case that large and big do seem to contrast in some 
very distinct though highly elusive way. But even so, some additional clarity on this 
point would be welcome. Finally, there are cross-linguistic questions to be asked. 
The construction examined here recurs in many languages, and indeed is not limited 
even to Indo-European (Hebrew has an analogue, for example). This in itself may 
require some explanation. In examining these cross-linguistic facts, though, inter­
esting points of variation emerge that warrant further scrutiny and may significantly 
alter the broader picture. 
Endnotes 
*Thanks to Alan Bale, Ana Arregui, Angelika Kratzer, Anna Maria di Sciullo, 
Anne-Michelle Tessier, Artemis Alexiadou, Bernhard Schwarz, Britta Sauereisen, 
Calixto Aguero-Bautista, Chris Barker, Chris Kennedy, lannis Thomadakis, Jan 
Anderssen, Jonny Butler, Rajesh Bhatt, and audiences at SALT and the University 
of Stuttgart. This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Re­
search Council of Canada (grant number 41 2-2003-1003 to Anna Maria di Sciullo 
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and the Interface Asymmetries Project at the Universite du Quebec a Montreal). 
11 will use a star to indicate ungrammaticality on the degree reading. 
2Strictly speaking, this won't yet do-it doesn't seem to have the consequence that 
only idiots be in the extension of idiot-so it actually has to involve two implicit de­
gree arguments, one of them the contextually-supplied standard normally assumed 
for adjectives as well. 
3Thanks to Bernhard Schwarz and Rajesh Bhatt to bringing this problem into 
sharper focus for me. 
4This is not an obvious or trivial assumption--:-if dumb involves negative degrees, 
as it probably does, idiot might seem to as well . On the other hand, negative de­
grees are really just ways of talking about the marked members of pairs that ex­
press opposite polarities; it makes sense to think of short as involving negative 
degrees because it is the marked member of the pair (short, tall) . Nouns, on the 
other hand, don't normally come in pairs of opposite polarity (modulo cases such 
as (??shortness, height)>-there is no unmarked noun that expresses the opposite 
of idiot. 
sOne important respect in which I 'm simplifying dramatically here is that all the 
vectors mentioned so far are 'located vectors' , which are understood as a pair of 
vectors. The first member of this pair is, in the cases relevant here, a trivial zero 
vector. 
6The arrows here informally represent historical development. 
1lmportantly, since both degrees and ordinary individuals can have bigness predi­
cated of them, x here has to be construed to range over both; that is, I assume that 
the domain of degrees Dd is a proper subset of De. (It would probably convenient, 
then, to distinguish a type for ordinary individuals, but for the sake of notational 
familiarity I won't  do that here. 
8We might also assume, to better parallel the semantics of degree words in the ad­
jectival system and in particular the semantics Kennedy proposes for the adjectival 
degree head counterpart of DEG-SIZE, that it introduces the standard and relates 
it to the nominal denotations. But placing reference to the standard here, rather 
than inside the denotation of the noun, would risk losing the generalization that 
gradable nominals always involve exceeding their standard, even in comparative 
contexts (Floyd is a bigger idiot than Clyde). Of course, no harm would be done by 
supposing that DEG-SIZE introduces this information redundantly. 
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